This paper responds to the considerable amount of attention given to gene transfer technology (aka gene doping) in the last three years by scholars within sport, medicine, and ethics (Miah, 2004; Munthe, 2000; Wadler, 1998). It examines the medical and ethical distinctions between therapy, non-therapy and enhancement upon which anti-doping is based, arguing that they are often conflated, but that it is the medical discourse that prevails. On this basis, most (illegal) human modifications in sport must be characterised as non-therapeutic, rather than enhancing. Thus, their utilisation does not entail the production of ‘super-humans’ or ‘mutants’, but only ‘marginally’ more capable athletes. Yet, the cultural discourse on the enhanced athlete-as-mutant dominates the ethical and political context of the doping debate. As such, sports authorities legitimise a misrepresentation of medical science, through its characterisation of the doped athlete. This representation is to the broader detriment of science and medicine, indicated by the representation of human genetics and cloning as fundamentally inhuman applications of technology. The fear of the ‘athlete mutant’ endorses and perpetuates the ‘Yuk Factor’ (Glover, 1999) response to emerging technology. By promoting a more critical debate about genetic modification in sport, it is argued that the athlete-as-mutant rhetoric of anti-doping discourses can be undermined. On this basis, the paper argues that transformative technologies – technologies that alter the physical constitution of an athlete – are an integral part of elite sport and that this enriches competition. This does not imply that all forms of modification should be legal in sport. However, it does acknowledge that elite competition is made meaningful partly because it involves people who have transformed themselves biologically. As such, the paper argues that a range of modifications, which are currently illegal, should become a legitimate part of the sporting contest. In particular, it argues that gene doping should be legalised in sport, on the basis of promoting a greater awareness and understanding of its benefits, as well as promoting sporting values. However, this perspective does not endorse the use of some drugs in sport, since, it is argued, drugs occupy a specific space in society, which limits their value to sport. This position is advantageous since gene transfer does not imply the same anti-social concerns as drug use. Indeed, it argues that prohibiting gene transfer technology in sport can contribute to further disengagement about this new technology by both athletes and the broader community, which would be undesirable. Moreover, by permitting gene doping, while remaining clearly against the use of drugs, sports organisations will be better placed to succeed in the so-called “drug war”.

References

Glover, J. (1999). Eugenics and Human Rights. The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights. J. Burley. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 101-124.

Miah, A. (2004). Genetically Modified Athletes: Biomedical Ethics, Gene Doping and Sport. London and New York, Routledge.

Munthe, C. (2000). Selected Champions: Making Winners in an Age of Genetic Technology. Values in Sport: Elitism, Nationalism, Gender Equality, and the Scientific Manufacture of Winners. T. Tännsjö and C. Tamburrini. London and New York, E & F.N. Spon: 217-231.

Wadler, G. I. (1998). Doping in Sport: From Strychnine to Genetic Enhancement, It's a Moving Target. The Duke Conference on Doping in Sport, R. David Thomas Executive Conference Center.

.