Introduction
The ethical implications of genetic technology in sport have become key agenda for international sport policy makers (Miah, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004). Moreover, there is already a tendency within international sport to frame genetics by the general terms of reference found within anti-doping organizations (WADA, 2002). All kinds of genetic modification are being given the generic term gene doping. For most people, this phrase is an entirely suitable and unproblematic way to describe the implications of genetic modification for sport. However, such a broad conceptualisation is not possible and for many of the different forms of genetic modification, they are not much like conventional forms of doping at all.

Discussion
This paper presents a philosophical and ethical argument claiming that the term gene doping is an inaccurate representation of how genetic technology might be used for sport and that there is a responsibility to avoid being against the use of genetics in sport as a general ethical principle. This approach does not advocate the free use of all kinds of genetic modification. Rather, it recognises that there has been only a limited attempt at conceptualising the ethical implications of genetics for sport within policy discussions so far. For this reason, the approach of prohibition is not possible to justify, without being accompanied by ongoing ethical evaluation.

The responsibility of policy makers should be less about implementation and pragmatism, and more about endeavouring to identify justifiable and rationale bases for drawing distinctions between various methods of performance modification. While this might seem quite straightforward, it conflicts substantially with the process of deliberation within sporting institutions. Houlihan (1999) identifies that anti-doping policy makers rarely dedicates time to the process of conceptualising the ethical issues. This limitation stifles the possibility for realizing how genetic technology might benefit sporting performances. It also negates the limitedness of being human in a practice where becoming posthuman (not superhuman) is desirable.
In order to fully take into account the value of genetic modification in sport (and outside of it), a further step must be taken by sporting authorities, which would necessitate eliminating the ‘anti’ part of anti-doping. Indeed, it might require eliminating anti-doping altogether and deriving a more representative description of the ethical issues concerning performance modification. Such a definition could distinguish between what are clearly medical policies on performance enhancement and what are ethical policies. Currently, anti-doping has very little option but to be against the principle of genetic modification and this approach fails to take into perspectives on the value of genetic technology.

References

Houlihan, B. (1999) Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy, Strasburg: Council of Europe Publishing.

Miah, A. (2001) 'Genetics, Privacy, and Athletes' Rights', Sports Law Bulletin, 4, 5: 10-12.

Miah, A. (2002a) 'Governance, Harmonisation, and Genetics: The World Anti-Doping Agency and its European Connections', European Sports Management Quarterly, 2, 4: 350-369.

Miah, A. (2002b) 'Bioethics, Sport and the Genetically Enhanced Athlete', Journal of Medical Ethics and Bioethics, 9, 3-4: 2-6.

Miah, A. (2003) 'Gene-Doping: Sport, Values & Bioethics', in J. Glasa. The Ethics of Human Genetics. Strasburg, Council of Europe: 171-180.

Miah, A. (2004, forthcoming) Genetically Modified Athletes: Biomedical Ethics, Gene Doping and Sport, London and New York: Routledge.

World Anti-Doping Agency, (2002) Press Release: WADA Conference Sheds Light on the Potential of Gene Doping. New York, World Anti-Doping Agency

Acknowledgments
Thanks to the British Academy for providing financial support for this paper and to the scientific committee of the IOC World Congress of Sport Science for inviting this paper.